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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Does the Utah Industrial Commission lack jurisdiction to
make an award of workers' compensation benefits when the
Applicant failed to file a claim for compensation within three
years of Applicant's accident, when neither Applicant's employer
nor an insurance carrier has provided either compensation or
medical treatment, and when Applicant's injury was not latent?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is de novo.

Appellants, United

Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, have been
substantially prejudiced by the Industrial Commission's acting
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute and erroneously
interpreting and applying the law.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-

16(4)(b) and (d).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953,
as amended in 1981).
(See addendum for text.)
Utah Workers' Coiapensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-100 (1953,
as amended in 1981).
Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment, the employee shall file
with the commission, in writing, notice of such accident,
with a copy to the employer; if such notice is so filed
ii

within three years of the time of the accident or within the
time limitation provided in section 35-1-99, the commission
shall obtain jurisdiction to make its award when the injury
becomes apparent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86 (1953) and Rule 14 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990).
On October 18, 1988, Respondent Kyle Lyman filed a claim for
compensation with the Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission).
The injury for which Respondent sought compensation occurred on
or about July 22, 1981, while Respondent was employed by
Appellant United Parcel Service (UPS).

The Commission, through

Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen, concluded that the
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim and
awarded benefits to Respondent.

On March 5, 1990, the Commission

denied Appellants1 Motion for Review of the ALJ's decision.
Appellants now appeal the Commission's conclusion that the
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Kyle Lyman alleges that on or about July 22, 1981
he suffered an industrial accident during the course of his
employment with UPS.

Respondent did not notify UPS and/or
•

t

•

in

Liberty Mutual of the alleged injury, however, until September 8,
1981, when Respondent entered the hospital to undergo disc
surgery.

Respondent was at this time employed by an employer

other than UPS.
On October 5, 1981 Liberty Mutual sent a letter to
Respondent denying Respondent's claim for workers1 compensation.
Liberty Mutual further notified Respondent that if he disagreed
with Liberty Mutual1s decision, he had the right to petition the
Industrial Commission for a hearing.

Liberty Mutual gave the

address and phone number of the Industrial Commission and told
Respondent that he had three (3) years from the date of his
accident in which to file the request.

At no time did UPS or

Liberty Mutual pay compensation, medical expenses or any other
benefits to Respondent.
Although Respondent called the Industrial Commission, he did
not file a request for a hearing until October 18, 1988—over
seven (7) years from the date of injury.
In awarding benefits to Respondent, the Industrial
Commission, through Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy C.
Allen, found that Respondents injury was an industrial injury
suffered during Respondents course of employment with UPS.

The

Commission further concluded that the Industrial Commission had
jurisdiction to make an award of compensation.
iv

On March 5, 1990,

the Commission denied Appellants1 Motion for Review of the ALJ's
decision.
Appellants now appeal the Commission's conclusion that the
Commission had jurisdiction to consider Respondent's claim.

v

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Respondent's Claim for Compensation is Barred Under the
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act

The Utah Workers1 Compensation Act requires that an injured
worker file a claim for compensation with the Industrial
Commission within three years from the date of the accident or
the last date on which compensation was received.

While there

are exceptions which excuse the failure to file within the three
year period, Respondent's case does not fall within any of these
exceptions.

As Respondent failed to file his claim for

compensation within the three year period, his claim is barred
under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.
II.

The Three-Year Filing Requirement Becomes Meaningless
If Jurisdiction Requires Neither Satisfaction of the
Requirement Nor an Exception to the Requirement

The Utah legislature has required that an injured worker
file a claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission
within three years from the date of the accident.

The

legislature has also recognized certain exceptions to the threeyear requirement.

To grant jurisdiction when neither the three-

year filing requirement nor one of the exceptions has been
satisfied would render the legislature's three-year requirement
meaningless.

vi

ARGUMENT
I.

Respondents Claim for Compensation Is Barred Under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act
A.

Mr, Lyman Failed to File a Claim for Compensation
Within Three Years of His Accident

Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
contains the twin elements that are necessary to set in action an
injured employee's right to compensation and benefits.

Dean

Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 1984).
Those elements are:
compensation.

Id.

(1) Notice of injury, and (2) Claim for
While the notice of injury is normally given

to the employer, the claim for compensation is normally filed
with the administrative agency.

2 A. Larson, Workmen's

Compensation Law. § 78.10 (1983).
The first sentence of § 35-1-99 requires that the employee
give notice to the employer of the time and place where the
injury occurred.

The second sentence requires that the employee

give such notice within one year from the date of the accident or
injury.
twofold:

The purpose of the "notice of injury" requirements is
"[F]irst, to enable the employer to provide immediate

medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the
seriousness of the injury; and second, to facilitate the earliest
possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury."
Morse, 692 P.2d at 781 (quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmenfs
1

Compensation Law, § 78.20 (1983)).
The third sentence of § 35-1-99 provides that all rights to
compensation shall be barred if no claim for compensation is
filed with the Commission within three years after the accident
or the last date the employee received any compensation.
692 P.2d at 781.

Morsef

The three-year limitation for filing a claim

for compensation "protect[s] the employer against claims too old
to be successfully investigated and defended."
Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.10 (1983).

2 A. Larson,

As time passes

following an accident, records are destroyed, witnesses move away
and memories fade.

Without the three-year limitation, the

employer is prejudiced in defending the case.
In the present case, Mr. Lyman has received no compensation
from either UPS or Liberty Mutual.

Thus, the three-year filing

period began to run on July 22, 1981—the date of Mr. Lymanfs
accident.

By filing his claim for compensation on October 18,

1988—over seven (7) years from the date of the accident—Mr.
Lyman has failed to comply with the three-year limitation.
During the time between the date of the accident and the date of
filing, several incidents have occurred which affect Appellants1
ability to effectively investigate and defend the case.
For example, medical records have been destroyed in
accordance with normal record retention practices.

2

Mr. Richard

Johnston, Mr. Lymanfs employer at the time Lyman first reported
his injury, has moved from the state.

The memories of witnesses

have faded due to the number of years that have passed.
Appellants1 ability to investigate, prepare and defend their case
is thus prejudiced by Lymanfs failure to comply with the threeyear limitation.

Unless Mr. Lyman qualifies for an exception to

the three-year filing requirement, his claim is barred under the
terms of § 35-1-99.
Possible exceptions to the three-year filing requirement
include:

(1) the § 35-1-99 tolling of the period for filing a

claim, (2) the § 35-1-100 "latent injury" exception, and (3) the
"informality principle," which recognizes that a claim for
compensation need not bear any particular formality.

Mr. Lyman's

situation does not fit into any one of these exceptions and thus
his claim is barred under § 35-1-99.
B.

The Period for Filing a Claim for Compensation Has
Not Tolled

In 1981, the Utah legislature codified a tolling exception
to the § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement.

Kennecott Corp.

v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The pertinent language of the 1981 amendment reads:
[T]he filing of a report or notice of accident or
injury with the Industrial Commission, the employer or
its insurance carrier, together with the payment of any
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical
treatment by the employer or an insurance carrier,
3

shall toll the period for filing such claim [for
compensation].
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, as amended in 1981) (emphasis
added) •
There are two important distinctions in the 1981 statute:
(1) The distinction between cases where benefits are paid by the
employer or insurance carrier vs. cases where no benefits are
paid, and (2) the distinction between a claim for compensation
vs. a notice of injury.
The distinctions are important for two reasons.

First,

tolling of the three-year period takes place only when benefits
have been paid.

Tolling under the 1981 statute clearly requires

(1) the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury with
the Industrial Commission, the employer or the employerfs
insurance carrier, together with (2) the payment of any
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by
the employer or an insurance carrier.
(1953, as amended in 1981).

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99

If no benefits are paid, the three-

year rule "wholly bar[s]" any claim for compensation filed after
three years from "the date of the accident or the date of last
payment of compensation."

Id.

Second, the "claim for compensation"/"notice of injury"
distinction is important because of the clarification which it

4

lends to court interpretations of the pre-1981 statute.

As the

Utah Court of Appeals noted in Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n. 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), "The Utah Supreme
Court has interpreted the former version of section 35-1-99 in
several recent cases.11
cases:

The Court of Appeals then discusses those

Utah State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982);

Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984);
Mecham v. Industrial Comm'n. 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); MannesVale. Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986).

Indeed, even

Kennecott involved application and interpretation of the pre-1981
language:

"This version [pre-1981] of the statute is controlling

in this case."

Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 308.

Each of these cases is a "notice of injury" case.

That is,

in each case, an injured employee failed to file a claim for
compensation within the statutorily required three-year period.
The Industrial Commission nonetheless had jurisdiction to hear
the cases because of the "notice of injury" exception which
tolled the three-year period for filing.

The Dutson. Morse,

Mecham, Mannes-Vale and Kennecott courts held that the employers1
first report of injury, along with certain other documents,
constituted sufficient notice to the Industrial Commission to
invoke the Commission1s jurisdiction.
Respondent Lyman's and the Industrial Commission's reliance
5

on these cases, however, is misguided*

In each of these cases,

the employer or the employer's insurance carrier had paid
compensation or provided medical treatment.

In 1981, the Utah

legislature codified the results of these "notice of injury11
cases, Kennecott, 740 P.2d at 308.

The legislature clearly

required the payment of compensation together with the notice of
injury before tolling could occur.
(1953, as amended in 1981).

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99

Thus, in the pre-1981-language

cases, the notice of injury exception was possible only because
the employer or the employees insurance carrier had paid
compensation to or provided medical treatment for the injured
employee.
In the present case, neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has paid
compensation or provided medical treatment to Mr. Lyman.

As

there has been no payment, as required by the § 35-1-99
exception, the exception is inapplicable to Mr. Lyman's
situation.

Thus, there has been no tolling of the three-year

period for filing a claim for compensation.
C.

Mr. Lymanfs Injury Was Not a Latent Injury and
Therefore Does Not Qualify for the Section 35-1100 Exception.

Traditional workers1 compensation law recognizes that the
failure to file a timely notice of injury may possibly be excused
if the employer is not harmed by the lateness of the filing.

6

Such is not the case with a claim for compensation,

lf

[F]ailure

to file a claim for compensation within the statutory period is
not generally, apart from specific statute, excused by an
argument that the employer was not harmed by the lateness of the
filing.11
(1983).

2 A. Larson, Workmenfs Compensation Law. § 78.20
One of the excuses for a late claim for compensation is

"latent injuries11 which "become apparent" after the statutory
period for filing has passed.

Larson at § 78.42.

Section 35-1-100 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
represents Utah's statutory exception for the hidden or latent
injury.

The section states:

Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment, the employee
shall file with the Commission, in writing, notice of
such accident, with a copy to the employer; if such
notice is so filed within three years of the time of
the accident or within the time limitation provided in
§ 35-1-99, the Commission shall obtain jurisdiction to
make its award when the injury becomes apparent.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-100 (1953, as amended in 1981) (emphasis
added).
This section provides an excuse for the employee whose
failure to file a timely claim for compensation is solely because
the injury is latent and does not "become apparent" until after
three years has passed.

If the employee originally filed a

timely notice of injury, the Commission obtains jurisdiction over

7

the claim when the injury becomes apparent.

The Utah legislature

intended this section to be an exception to the three-year bar in
§ 35-1-99.

The section was not# however, intended to cancel the

§ 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement.
Sections 35-1-99 and -100 are to work together in protecting
the right of an injured employee to obtain compensation.

At the

same time, they must also protect the employer's right to a
timely, unprejudiced investigation of the employee's injury and
claim.

To allow § 35-1-100 to cancel the § 35-1-99 filing

requirement in cases in which no latent injury is involved would
be to entirely disregard the employer's right to timely
investigation.
In the present case, Mr. Lyman is not entitled to the § 351-100 "latent injury" exception.

Mr. Lyman's injury occurred on

July 22, 1981.

Surgery took place less than two months later, in

September 1981.

The results of the initial injury were clearly

not latent.

Nor has there been any subsequent development

resulting from the 1981 injury which can be considered a latent
injury.

Mr. Lyman simply failed to comply with the § 35-1-99

three-year filing requirement.
Mr. Lyman's failure to comply was not due to unawareness or
lack of understanding.

On October 5, 1981, Liberty Mutual sent a

letter to Mr. Lyman denying his claim for compensation.

8

In that

letter, Liberty Mutual informed Mr, Lyman of his right to
petition the Industrial Commission for a hearing.

The letter

further gave the address and phone number of the Commission and
notified Mr. Lyman of the three-year filing requirement.

Mr.

Lyman called the Commission but made a conscious decision not to
file a claim.

Mr. Lyman clearly never intended to file a claim

until October 18, 1988.
Thus, as Mr. Lymanfs injury was not latent, he was not
entitled to the § 35-1-100 "latent injury" exception.

The

Commission did not obtain jurisdiction over the claim when the
injury became apparent because the injury became apparent well
within the three-year filing period.

Mr. Lyman had every

opportunity to file within the statutory period.
filed.

He could have filed.

He should have

He simply chose not to do so.

To

allow jurisdiction under these circumstances would be to condone
Mr. Lyman's conscious disregard for the statutory filing period.
Furthermore, jurisdiction in this case would completely deny
Appellants1 right to the protection afforded by the § 35-1-99
three-year requirement.

The Utah legislature never intended such

unjust results when it enacted § 35-1-100.
As Mr. Lyman's injury was not latent, he is not entitled to
the § 35-1-100 exception.

As he received no compensation or

medical treatment from either his employer or the employer's
9

insurance carrier, the three-year filing period did not toll.
Thus, as Mr. Lyman failed to file a claim for compensation within
the three-year period, his claim is barred under § 35-1-99.
D.

UPS1 Original Report of the Accident, Along With
Subsequent Medical Reports and Filings. Does Not
Constitute a Claim for Compensation Under the
Informality Principle

The Utah courts have long recognized that a claim for
compensation need not bear any particular formality.
Ins. Fund v. Dutson. 646 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1982).

Utah State
Not every

document filed with the Industrial Commission, however, qualifies
as a valid substitute for a formal claim.

M

At the minimum, the

informal substitute for a claim should identify the claimant,
indicate that a compensable injury has occurred, and convey the
idea that compensation is expected."

3 A. Larson, Workmenfs

Compensation Law, § 78.11 (1983).
In Perdue v. Daniel Int'l, Inc., 59 N.C. App. 517, 296
S.E.2d 845 (1982), petition for review denied, 299 S.E.2d 647, a
claimant's employer filed an employee report form.
also visited a doctor regularly for treatment.

The claimant

Thus, medical

reports were also presumably filed with the Commission.

The

Commission wrote a letter to notify the claimant of the need for
a formal claim.

The claimant nonetheless failed to take any

action until after the statutory two-year period had passed.

10

In

holding the claim to be untimely, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals declared:
There is no provision in the North Carolina Workmenfs
Compensation Act requiring an injured employee to file
a claim for compensation. . . . [T]he employer is
required to report the accident . • . to the Commission
on Form 19.
Perdue, 59 N.C. App. 517, 296 S.E.2d 845 (1982) (quoting Hardison
v. W.H. Hampton and Son, 203 N.C. 187, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1932)).
In the present case, as in Perdue, the employer has filed a
notice of injury with the Commission in compliance with its
statutory duty.

There have likewise been medical reports filed

in compliance with statutory duty.

These filings, however, do

not qualify as substitutes for a formal claim for compensation.
While the statutorily-required filings identify the injured
employee and the nature of the accident, they do not indicate
that a compensable injury hast occurred.

Nor do the filings

convey the idea that compensation is expected.

Furthermore, Mr.

Lyman knew, as did the claimant in Perdue, that he must file a
claim with the Commission as a condition precedent to his right
to compensation.

Because of Mr. Lyman1s clear lack of intent to

file a claim prior to October 18, 1988, along with the failure of
the employer and medical reports to convey the idea that
compensation was expected, the statutorily-required filings do
not qualify as a substitute for a formal claim.
11

The Colorado Court of Appeals has ruled similar to the North
Carolina Courtfs ruling in Perdue.

Martin v. Industrial Comm'n.

608 P.2d 366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).

In Martin, the employer of

an injured employee filed a notice of injury with the Industrial
Commission.

Although the employee was wat least somewhat

knowledgeable that compensation benefits were available11, Martin.
608 P.2d at 368, he failed to file a claim for compensation
within the prescribed time limit.

The Industrial Commission held

that the claim was barred.
The claimant argued on appeal that the employerfs notice of
injury gave sufficient information to the Commission, thus making
the filing of a formal claim unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals

rejected the claimantfs argument and affirmed the Commissions
finding that the claim was time-barred.

In so holding, the Court

quoted from A. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law:

"At a

minimum, the informal substitution for a claim should identify
the claimant, indicate that a compensable injury has occurred,
and convey the idea compensation is expected."
Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.11

3 A. Larson,

The Court pointed out that

the reports filed by the employer and the employer's insurer
"[did] not assert that a compensable injury has occurred nor give
notice that compensation is expected."

Martin. 608 P.2d at 369.

As already discussed above, the employer's statutorily12

required notice of injury and the statutorily-required medical
reports filed in the present case likewise fail to assert that a
compensable injury has occurred or that compensation is expected.
Thus, under Martin. Mr. Lyman's failure to file a timely claim
for compensation is not excused by the Minformality principle.11
The reports and notices filed by Mr. Lymanfs employer and doctors
are simply insufficient to qualify as substitutes for a formal
claim for compensation.
In City and County of Denver (Denver Hy. Unit) v. Bush, 441
P.2d 666 (Colo. 1968), the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
claim for compensation filed twenty months after the claimant's
injury was barred by a one-year statute because the late filing
prejudiced the employer's right to fully investigate and mitigate
the claim.

The employer had notice of the injury, but had made

no admission of liability.

Furthermore, although the State

Compensation Fund had paid the medical expenses for claimant's
examination and drugs for treatment, no compensation was paid by
the Fund.
In holding the claim to be time-barred, the Colorado Supreme
Court declared, "notice of the accident is not equivalent to
notice of claim for compensable injury."

Bush, 441 P.2d at 668.

Indeed, the notice of the injury which the employer had received
indicated that there was no claim for compensation.

13

The employee

had continued to work following the alleged injury.
alleged injury —
bucket —

Thus, the

pain experienced as a result of lifting a mop

appeared to be a noncompensable injury.

In the present case, as in Bush, Mr. Lyman continued to work
following his alleged industrial injury.

He did not even report

the bump to his hip while in the employ of Appellant UPS.
Rather, UPS first learned of Mr. Lyman1s alleged injury almost
two months later, when Mr. Lyman was no longer employed by UPS
and when he was in the hospital awaiting surgery.
As in Bush, Mr. Lymanfs injury appeared to be a
noncompensable injury.

That is, although Mr. Lyman suffered a

bump to the hip, the actual problem for which Respondent was
undergoing surgery appeared to have been the result of other
incidents.

Mr. Lyman had a history of muscle spasms and back

problems experienced while in the Navy and as a result of
athletic activity.

Furthermore, Mr. Lymanfs surgery could have

been the result of activities related to his employment at the
time of seeking medical treatment.

UPS simply did not receive

its statutory right to provide medical treatment and attempt to
mitigate Mr. Lymanfs injuries.

Thus, UPS1 right to investigate,

mitigate and defend this claim has been prejudiced by the lack of
opportunity to be actively involved in attempting to treat and
mitigate Mr. Lymanfs injury.

14

UPS1 right has been further prejudiced by Mr. Lymanfs delay
in filing a claim for compensation.

When UPS and Liberty Mutual

denied Mr. Lyman's initial request for compensation, they
informed Mr. Lyman of the need to petition a hearing with the
Industrial Commission.

It is this filing with the Commission

which gives both the employer and the Commission the required
notice that a claimant expects compensation.

Absent this filing,

an employer assumes that the employee has accepted the denial of
the original request for compensation.

Only when the employee

files a claim for compensation with the Commission does the
employer become aware of the need to further investigate the
claim and defend the denial of compensation.
In the present case, Mr. Lyman did not file a claim with the
Commission until over seven years after the date of accident.
While a 20-month delay prejudiced the employer in Bush, a sevenyear delay in the present case is clearly more severe.

UPS had

no idea that Mr. Lyman intended to pursue the matter further with
the Commission until October 18, 1988. As UPS had neither
acknowledged liability for Mr. Lyman%s injury nor waived its
right to the § 35-1-99 three-year protection, it had for some
time considered Lyman1s claim closed.

Furthermore, in the seven

year period, medical records had been destroyed, witnesses had
moved and memories had faded.

15

UPS was clearly prejudiced in its ability to investigate,
prepare and defend this claim.

As the Bush court declared#

"[N]on-prejudice to the employer is a necessary pre-requisite to
the acceptance of [an informal, time-delayed] claim."
P.2d at 667.

Bush, 441

The filing of the statutorily-required employer's

notice of injury and physicians1 medical reports does not
constitute a claim for compensation under the "informality
principle."

Mr. Lyman1s delay resulted in considerable prejudice

to Appellants UPS and Liberty Mutual.

To allow the statutorily-

required filings to satisfy the claim for compensation would be
unfair to Appellants because of the prejudice.
The Utah cases which recognize the informality principle are
of no benefit to Mr. Lyman.

Kennecott, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah Ct.

App. 1987), Mannes-Vale. 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986), Mecham, 692
P.2d 783 (Utah 1984), Morse. 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984), and
Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), all recognize that a claim for
compensation need not bear any particular formality.

In

approving of the informality principle, the Kennecott, MannesVale. Mecham and Morse courts cite to Dutson for recognition of
the principle.
In Dutson, the Utah Supreme Court held that an "Employer's
First Report of Injury," an attending physician%s "Medical
Report," and a "Notice:

Payment of Temporary Disability
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Compensation" filed with the Commission were sufficient to
constitute a claim for compensation.
Court declared:

Significantly, however, the

"[T]he documents filed confirm that:

1)

Wholesale Cleaners and State Insurance Fund recognized liability;
2) compensation and medical benefits were paid; and 3) payments
of compensation and medical benefits would continue."
646 P.2d at 709.

Dutson.

Based on the content of the filings, then, the

Court found that the documents were "adequate . . . to confer
jurisdiction upon the Commission."

Id.

Likewise, in Kennecott. Mannes-Vale, Mecham and Morse it was
the content of the documents which allowed the Court to find
jurisdiction in the Commission.

In each of these cases, the

employers had acknowledged some liability and there had been
compensation.

Furthermore, the employers had either indicated

that compensation would continue or had "led a reasonable person
to assume that no formal adversary action would be necessary to
protect his rights."

Mannes-Vale. 717 P.2d at 712 (quoting 3 A.

Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.43(m), at 15-293 (1981)).
The present case includes none of the factors which the Utah
courts relied upon in Kennecott, Mannes-Vale. Mecham. Morse and
Dutson.

Neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has at any time

acknowledged liability for Mr. Lyman1s injury.

To the contrary,

they have from the outset denied that Mr. Lymanfs bump to the hip
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caused the injuries which resulted in Mr. Lymanfs September 1981
surgery.

Furthermore, neither UPS nor Liberty Mutual has paid

either compensation or medical benefits.

Finally, UPS and

Liberty Mutual have in no way indicated that compensation would
be forthcoming or that formal adversary action would be
unnecessary.

Rather, Liberty Mutual made it clear in its October

5, 1981 letter to Mr. Lyman that Mr. Lyman's request for
compensation was denied and that Mr. Lyman would have to petition
the Commission for a hearing if he (Mr. Lyman) wanted to
challenge the denial.
The content of the documents filed by UPS and by Mr. Lymanfs
physicians in no way satisfies the requirements for an informal
claim for compensation.

The documents simply satisfy statutory

duty by providing information about the nature of the injury.
They do not indicate that a compensable injury has occurred.

Nor

do they indicate that compensation is expected by Mr. Lyman.

As

the documents do not qualify for the "informality principle"
exception, Mr. Lyman's claim is subject to the § 35-1-99 threeyear requirement or other possible exceptions to the requirement.
As we have already seen, Mr. Lyman does not qualify for
either the § 35-1-99 tolling exception or the § 35-1-100 latent
injury exception.

Thus, Mr. Lyman's claim falls squarely within

the requirements of the § 35-1-99 three-year rule.
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Mr. Lyman has

failed to comply with this rule.

He knew of the need to comply.

He had no obstacles or barriers to prevent his compliance.
simply failed to comply.

He

His failure to comply indicates either

a lack of intent to pursue the matter or a complete disregard for
the statutorily-required filing requirement.

In either case, as

Mr. Lyman fails to fall under any of the exceptions to the threeyear requirement, his failure to comply results in the bar of his
claim.
As § 35-1-99 bars Mr. Lymanfs claim, the Industrial
Commission has at no time obtained jurisdiction over this claim.
The Industrial Commission's ruling to the contrary was thus in
error and requires reversal by the Court of Appeals.
II.

The Three-Year Filing Requirement Becomes Meaningless
If Jurisdiction Requires Neither Satisfaction of the
Requirement Nor an Exception to the Requirement

Section 35-1-99 of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
requires the filing of both a notice of injury and a claim for
compensation before an injured employee is entitled to
compensation and benefits.

Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v.

Morse. 692 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 1984).

While the notice of injury

is normally given to the employer, the claim for compensation "is
normally filed with the administrative agency.11

2 A. Larson,

Workmenfs Compensation Lav. § 78.10 (1983).
Section 35-1-99 bars an employee's claim for compensation if
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the employee fails to file the claim within three years of the
date of accident or the last payment of compensation.

As

discussed above, the Utah legislature has provided, and the
courts have recognized, certain exceptions to the three-year
filing requirement.

One such exception is the § 35-1-99 "notice-

of-injury-plus-payment-of-compensation" tolling exception.
In 1981, the legislature codified the results of several
Utah cases interpreting the pre-1981 version of § 35-1-99.
Kennecott v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

In those cases —

and Dutson —

Kennecott, Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse

the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of

Appeals found that the employers1 notice of injury, along with
certain other documents and the employers1 payment of
compensation, excused the injured employees1 late filing of a
claim for compensation.

The 1981 codification of the results of

these cases reads:
[T]he filing of a report or notice of accident or
injury with the industrial commission, the employer or
its insurance carrier, together with the payment of any
compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical
treatment by the employer or an insurance carrier,
shall toll the period for filing such claim [for
compensation].
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953, as amended in 1981).
As the 1981 amendment codifies the results of the pre-1981language cases, those cases are clearly "notice-of-injury" cases.
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That is, filing a notice of injury, along with the payment of
compensation, excuses an employeefs untimely filing of a claim
for compensation by tolling the filing period.

The notice-of-

injury tolling exception does not take the place of filing a
claim for compensation.

The injured employee must still file a

claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission.

The

exception merely excuses a claim which is filed late but before
eight years.
To interpret Kennecott, Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and
Dutson as "notice-of-claims" rather than "notice-of-injury" cases
would render the three-year filing requirement of § 35-1-99
meaningless.

Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and Dutson do not hold

that an employer's compliance with the § 35-1-97 filing of a
notice of injury alone satisfies the § 35-1-99 requirement that
the employee file a claim for compensation within three years.
Under this "notice-of-claims" interpretation, the only time the §
35-1-99 three-year requirement would bar an employee1s claim is
when the employer fails to comply with the reporting requirement
of § 35-1-97.
Under Kennecott, however, not even the employer's failure to
report an injury under § 35-1-97 will result in a § 35-1-99 bar
of an untimely claim.

In Kennecott, 740 P.2d 305 (Utah Ct. App.

1987), the injured employee did not file a claim for compensation
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with the Commission within three years of the date of his
accident.

Nor did the employer report the injury to the

Commission as required by § 35-1-97.

Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 309.

The Utah Court of Appeals nonetheless held that the employeefs
claim was not barred under § 35-1-99.

The court reasoned that,

"had the employer filed the required report of injury under
section 35-1-97, the Commission would have been on notice."
Kennecott. 740 P.2d at 309.

The Court of Appeals refused to

allow the employer's failure to comply with § 35-1-97 serve as a
defense against the employee's untimely claim for compensation.
Under a "notice-of-claim" interpretation, then, the § 35-199 three-year filing requirement becomes meaningless.

If under

Mannes-Vale, Mecham, Morse and Dutson, an employer's statutorilyrequired filing of a notice of injury satisfies the three-year
requirement.

And under Kennecott. even the employer's failure to

file satisfies the § 35-1-99 requirement.

Then, under the

"notice-of-claim" interpretation, there is no need for the
employee to file a claim for compensation within three years of
his accident.

The § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement is

erased.
The Utah legislature never intended such a result.

Sections

35-1-99 and -100 clearly require that the employee file a claim
with the Commission within three years from the date of accident
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in order to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction.

The "notice-

of-claim" interpretation of Kennecott, Mannes-Vale. Mecham, Morse
and Dutson thus provides a result which is contrary to the
legislature's intent.

Such an interpretation is therefore

inappropriate.
The proper interpretation recognizes Kennecott. Mannes-Vale,
Mecham. Morse and Dutson not as "notice-of-claim" cases, but as
"notice-of-injury" cases.

The courts1 finding of jurisdiction in

those cases lay in the fact that the employers and the Commission
had (or would have had, in Kennecott) notice of the employees1
injuries.

The notice of injury, combined with payment by the

employer or the employer's insurance carrier, thus tolled the §
35-1-99 filing period.

The tolling of the filing period was an

exception to the § 35-1-99 three-year filing requirement —

not a

substitute for it.
To find jurisdiction in the present case, where neither the
statutory filing requirement nor an exception to the requirement
has been satisfied, renders the statute meaningless.

Such a

result is clearly contrary to the legislature's intent and is
inappropriate.

Thus, the Industrial Commission's finding of

jurisdiction was inappropriate and therefore requires reversal by
the Court of Appeals.
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CONCLUSION
The Utah Industrial Commission erred in finding that it had
jurisdiction over Mr. Lymanfs claim.

Mr. Lyman failed to satisfy

the three-year filing requirement of § 35-1-99, and his claim
does not qualify for an exception to the requirement.

The Court

of Appeals should therefore reverse the Industrial Commissions
finding of jurisdiction over Mr. Lyman1s claim.
DATED this

I

d<$ of June, 1990.
JENSEN

[M^

& mmi/L._ P.C,

Denton M. Hatch
Attorneys for Appellants
United Parcel and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
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ADDENDUM
Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953,
as amended in 1981):
When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in the
service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer
of the time and place where the accident and injury
occurred, and of the nature of the same, within 48 hours,
when possible, or fails to report for medical treatment
within said time, the compensation provided for herein shall
be reduced 15%; provided, that knowledge of such injury
obtained from any source on the part of such employer, his
managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in
authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured
sufficient to afford an opportunity to the employer to make
an investigation into the facts and to provide medical
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect
or inaccuracy therein shall subject the claimant to such
reduction, if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice
the employer in making his defense, and the employer was
not, in fact, so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice
of the accident and injury is given to the employer within
one year from the date of the accident, the right to
compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for
compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within
three years from the date of the accident or the date of the
last payment of compensation, the right to compensation
shall be wholly barred; provided, however, that the filing
of a report or notice of accident or injury with the
Industrial Commission, the employer or its insurance
carrier, together with the payment of any compensation
benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by the
employer or an insurance carrier, shall toll the period for
filing such claim until the employer or its carrier notifies
the Industrial Commission and employee, in writing, of its
denial of liability or further liability, as the case may
be, for the industrial accident or injury, with instructions
upon said notification of denial to the employee to contact
the Industrial Commission for further advice or assistance
to preserve or protect the employee's rights; and provided
further, that the said claim for compensation in any event
must be filed within 8 years from the date of the accident.
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